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Abstract
For voters with “social” preferences, the expected utility of voting is approximately indepen-
dent of the size of the electorate, suggesting that rational voter turnouts can be substantial even
in large elections. Less important elections are predicted to have lower turnout, but a feedback
mechanism keeps turnout at a reasonable level under a wide range of conditions. The main
contributions of this paper are: (1) to show how, for an individual with both selﬁsh and social
preferences, the social preferences will dominate and make it rational for a typical person to
vote even in large elections; (2) to show that rational socially-motivated voting has a feedback
mechanism that stabilizes turnout at reasonable levels (e.g., 50% of the electorate); (3) to link
the rational social-utility model of voter turnout with survey ﬁndings on socially-motivated vote
choice.
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1 Introduction
We demonstrate that voting is rational even in large elections if individuals have “social” preferences
and are concerned about social welfare. In a large election, the probability that a vote is decisive
is small, but the social beneﬁts at stake in the election is large, and so the expected utility beneﬁt
of voting to an individual with social preferences can be signiﬁcant. What is perhaps surprising is
that the expected value of the social beneﬁt does not approach zero or even diminish as the number
of voters grows large.
The key way in which we go beyond a circular argument (of the form, “people vote because
it gives them positive utility”) is that we consider the perceived social beneﬁt not simply as a
psychological feature of the individual but as a utility that is proportional to the probability of
being pivotal (itself endogenous) and to the number of persons aﬀected by the election under
consideration. We believe that this calculation is roughly consistent with the way citizens perceive
voting and participation—not simply as a (possibly) enjoyable act or as a discrete duty, but as a
potential contribution to the general good. The larger the jurisdiction in which the election applies,
the larger the potential eﬀect of the election outcome on the general welfare.
Agents in rational-choice models are typically assumed to have “selﬁsh” preferences. We argue
that separating the rationality assumption from the selﬁshness assumption reveals that (a) the act
of voting can be rational, and (b) a rational voter will decide which candidate or option to vote
for based on the voter’s judgment of the expected social consequences of the election outcome as
distinct from the direct consequences to that voter. We show this for a simple model in which voters
2decide whether to vote, and how to vote, based on maximizing an expected utility with both selﬁsh
and social terms.
More important than explaining that it is rational for people to vote (if they have social prefer-
ences) is our observation that, for the very reasons it is rational to vote in a large election, even a
mostly-selﬁsh person who votes should as a descriptive matter vote for what he or she perceives to
be the common good, or at the least the good of a large aﬃnity group, but not for direct individual
gain. Thus our model explains not just why but also how rational people vote. This voting theory
suggests that models of the vote choices of rational individuals should work with social rather than
selﬁsh utility functions. Survey ﬁndings on voters’ motivations are, in fact, broadly consistent with
rational models of voting (see Section 4.3). The predictions regarding how people vote may at
times be similar for selﬁsh and sociotropic models, of course, to the extent that individuals bias
their views of what will help others by what will help themselves.
It is well known that voting in large elections cannot be explained in terms of the selﬁsh beneﬁts
of voting to the individual: the probability that a vote is decisive is too low for voting to be
“worth it” in an expected utility sense (see Downs, 1957, Riker and Ordeshook, 1968, Ferejohn
and Fiorina, 1974, Meehl, 1977, Aldrich, 1993, Green and Shapiro, 1994, and Gelman, King, and
Boscardin, 1998). Intrinsic theories of voting understand voting as an experience that provides
psychological beneﬁts, but such explanations do not help us predict variations in voter turnout,
such as high turnout in close elections and Presidential elections. Nor do they provide guidance in
understanding which candidates a voter will prefer.
We claim that one reason a voter would support George Bush for U.S. President in 2000, for
example, was because the voter thought that Bush would be better for the country as a whole,
even if most Americans did not see that. The voter is not updating based upon the opinions of the
other voters in order to judge the quality or social utility of Bush. Instead, we model the voter’s
subjective social beneﬁts as proportional to the number of citizens, and independent of the way
other citizens vote.1
As the probability of being pivotal shrinks, people will be less apt to vote (though there is a
feedback here, because as fewer people vote, the chance of being pivotal increases; see Section 2.2).
As the stakes and importance of the election increases (say because candidates are farther apart on
the issues or because it is a Presidential election), more will vote. Likewise, as the cost of voting
declines, more people, and importantly more people who are poorly informed, will ﬁnd it rational
1A failure to update reﬂects that the voter feels strongly enough about which candidate is best for the country
that his or her mind will not be changed simply because the majority of voters disagree. In this framework, the two
groups of voters in an election do not represent competing interests but rather competing perspectives about what is
best for the country.
3to vote. Finally, our model predicts that holding constant these other factors, election size will not
substantially inﬂuence turnout rates,2 except among very small elections where selﬁsh concerns may
play a role.
We present our model in Section 2 of this paper and review broadly supporting evidence in
Sections 3 and 4. We conclude in Section 5 with a discussion of the implications of our results for
vote choices as well as voter turnout, and with a discussion of various possible empirical tests and
implications of our model.
2 A social-beneﬁt model of rational voter turnout
2.1 If one cares about others, it can be rational to vote
We shall develop the following argument: suppose n persons vote in an election that aﬀects a
jurisdiction with a population of N; then the beneﬁt of having the preferred candidate win the
election is proportional to N. This is multiplied by a probability of decisiveness that is proportional
to 1/n, and thus the expected utility of voting is proportional to N/n, which is approximately
independent of the size of the electorate.3
In the basic rational-choice model of voting and political participation (see Blais, 2000, for an
overview and many references), the relative utility of voting, for a particular eligible voter, is
∆U = pB − c, (1)
where p is the probability that a single vote will be decisive, B is the relative beneﬁt associated
with your desired candidate winning the election, and c is the net cost of voting—that is, the costs,
minus the direct beneﬁt of voting (whether or not your candidate wins).4
Acting in a manner consistent with this sort of cost-beneﬁt analysis is the standard deﬁnition
of rationality as utility maximization. Traditionally, B is understood to refer to direct beneﬁts to
2This is diﬀerent from some game-theoretic calculations assuming purely selﬁsh utilities that predict positive
turnout that would be below 1% in a large election (see, Ledyard, 1984, Green and Shapiro, 1994, and Feddersen and
Pesendorfer, 1996, for discussions of such models).
3A crucial part of our analysis is the recognition that p is of order 1/n (see the Appendix for discussion and
references on this issue). For example, in his review of rational-choice models of voting, Dowding (2005) refers to
models of social utilities—such as considered here—as the “B-term solution”, but dismisses such models based on a
mistaken belief that the probability of a decisive vote is as low as 10
−90. In fact, 10
−7 or 10
−8 are more reasonable
values for U.S. Presidential elections (Gelman, King, and Boscardin, 1998) with much higher probabilities for many
Congressional races (Mulligan and Hunter, 2002). Models for the probability of tied elections can get complicated (see
Gelman, Katz, and Tuerlinckx, 2002) but the extremely low estimates cited by Dowding seem implausible, given that
there have been several very close Presidential elections in recent decades, as well as over 500 Congressional elections
in the past century that were decided by less than 1000 votes. The probability of a decisive vote is low but is clearly
distinct from zero, if multiplied by a beneﬁt term that is proportional to the size of the electorate.
4This last term is often written in two parts, separating the direct costs C and direct beneﬁts D, but we shall only
need to work with the diﬀerence or net cost, c = C − D.
4the voter. This is the assumption of self-interest. We keep the rationality but break the link to
pure self-interest by expanding the beneﬁt term in (1) to include individual beneﬁts Bself and social
beneﬁts Bsoc for an aﬀected population of size N:
B = Bself + αNBsoc. (2)
Here, Bsoc is the average beneﬁt per person if the preferred candidate wins, and α is a discounting
factor to reﬂect that beneﬁts to others are less important than beneﬁts to self; thus, we would expect
α < 1 for most people. The factor Bsoc represents the beneﬁt to others as perceived by the person
making the decision whether to vote; it is not an averaging of the actual utilities or preferences of
the N persons in the population aﬀected by the election.5
Deﬁnition. A voter is selﬁsh if α = 0 and social if α > 0 in (2).
Assumption. The probability of a pivotal vote is inversely proportional to the num-
ber of voters, n. (This assumption is reasonable because the closeness of elections, in
percentage terms, does not depend strongly on the number of voters, n. Hence the
probability that an individual vote is decisive—which essentially is the probability that
an election is exactly tied—is of order 1/n. See the Appendix for further discussion of
this point.)
We write the probability that a vote is decisive as
p = K/n, (3)
where K represents the competitiveness of the election. As discussed in the Appendix, K = 10 is
a reasonable value for close elections, with smaller values in elections that are not expected to be
close.
Proposition 1. For a selﬁsh voter, the expected beneﬁts from being pivotal and swing-
ing the election vanish as n grows. As a result, voting in large elections only makes sense
for selﬁsh voters if they enjoy the act of voting itself (that is, if c < 0 in (1)).
5This has similarities with the “dual-utility function” literature in economics. See Coate and Conlin (2005),
Harsanyi (1955, 1969), Margolis (1981), and Feddersen and Sandroni (2002). This tradition tends to focus on possible
equilibria within a game theoretic framework (and the associated comparative statics). In contrast, we embed our
individual and social beneﬁts within a decision theoretic framework. This facilitates a probabilistic treatment which
provides unique insights.
Our model is also similar to that of Jankowski (2002); we go further by explicitly including in the model the number
of voters n and the population size N, which allows us to demonstrate the stability of turnout under the model, as
we describe in Section 2.2.
5For example, consider a two-candidate election with n voters. Suppose the election is anticipated
to be close, and each candidate is expected to get between 47 and 53 percent of the vote (and thus
the vote diﬀerential is expected to be in the range ±6%). The probability that a single vote is
decisive is then about 1/(0.12n).6 So for a selﬁsh voter, the expected utility gain from potentially
swinging the outcome of the election is about Bself/(0.12n), which even for a moderately large
election (e.g., n = 1 million) is minor: even if the outcome of the election is worth $10,000 to
a particular voter, the expected utility gain is less than 10 cents. This point has been widely
recognized (see the references at the beginning of this paper). Given that the act of voting has a
nonzero cost, voter turnout is thus usually attributed to some mix of irrationality, confusion, and
the direct gratiﬁcations of voting (including the performance of a civic duty); that is, a negative net
cost c of the act of voting. However, these motivations do not explain observed variations in voter
turnout between elections. In addition, voting is an act with large-scale consequences beyond any
immediate satisfaction it gives to the voter. At the very least, many voters seem to consider their
voting actions with more seriousness than other low-cost consumption decisions.
Proposition 2. For a social voter, the expected beneﬁts of being pivotal and swinging
the election have a nonzero asymptote proportional to αBsoc, which does not vanish as
n increases.
For example, consider the same hypothetical election as above, in which the n voters represent
a jurisdiction with population N. Further suppose that 1/3 of the population are voters; that
is, n/N = 1/3. If you, as a potential voter, think that the net beneﬁt to your fellow citizens of
candidate A winning the election is the equivalent of Bsoc = $10 per citizen, then you are eﬀectively
giving them a total of $10N/(0.12n) = $10N/(0.12(N/3)) = $250 in expected value by voting.
Voting in such a circumstance is a perfectly reasonable thing to do, regardless of population size:
a small eﬀort yields a substantial expected social gain, equivalent in some ways to giving $250 to
a national charity. For example, if your discounting factor for beneﬁts to others is α = 0.1, then
your net utility gain from voting is positive as long as your cost of voting c is less than $25. In
many elections with issues such as national security, global climate change, and nuclear weapons
proliferation, a rational citizen could think that the superiority of his or her candidate might deliver
an expected value per citizen far in excess of $10, and thus an expected return on voting far in
excess of $250.
By separating rationality and selﬁsh preferences—two assumptions that have usually been linked,
6This assumes that the probability distribution for the vote diﬀerential is approximately uniform in the range of
uncertainty. Using a diﬀerent distributional form would change the coeﬃcient but not the proportionality to 1/n.
6but that have no logical connection—we see that voting in large populations is perfectly rational.
Our model also leads to a diﬀerent prediction of the choices people make when they vote. As the
size of the population increases, the expected social contribution to utility comes to dominate the
direct individual utility, which shrinks to 0. As a result, as population size grows, an individual may
change his or her vote and begin to vote for the social good instead of the individual good. Hence
a shareholder in a privately held company with four shareholders might vote for his own interest.
However, in a national election, if a person makes a rational decision to vote, he or she will vote
for policies that he or she perceives to be in others’ interests. Of course most people have a natural
bias to think that what interests them will interest others, so the two motivations may be easily
confused in practice.7
2.2 Feedback mechanism keeps voter turnout relatively stable
Our social-beneﬁt model of voter motivation has a feedback mechanism that explains why turnout
settles to a stable level at a sizeable fraction of the electorate. If turnout becomes very low, then n
decreases, and thus the factor N/n increases, and it becomes more reasonable to vote.8 We explore
the feedback in detail using our model.





It is useful to express this in terms of b = B/N, the expected beneﬁt, per aﬀected person in the
population, of changing the election outcome,




Finally, we deﬁne nelig as the number of eligible voters and T as the proportional voter turnout, so




b − c =
KN
neligT
b − c, (5)
to express the utility of voting in terms of population size and voter turnout.
7For example, Bafumi (2005) ﬁnds that voters’ perceptions of economic conditions have been increasingly tied to
their political partisanship.
8This feedback also occurs with the instrumental-beneﬁt model, but there the expected utility of voting is so low
that voter turnout will stabilize at less then 1% in large elections (Ledyard, 1984).
Bendor, Diermeier, and Ting (2003) and Fowler (2005b) also present feedback models for voter turnout but they
diﬀer from ours in relying on “satisﬁcing” rather than utility maximization. In their models, people may choose to
vote even knowing that the probability of decisive vote is zero; in contrast, our feedback mechanism works because, as
turnout declines, the probability of a vote being decisive increases, causing the expected beneﬁt of voting to increase.
7If N is large (as in most elections of interest), then from (4) we see that b ≈ αBsoc and does not
depend on N. In general, b should be positive, but c can be either positive or negative. The ratio
c/b can be considered the net cost of voting, for a particular voter, per unit gain in the population.
In the notation of (1), it is rational for a person to vote if ∆U > 0; from (5),







We can assume a distribution of c/b among the population of eligible voters and then use the
model to explore how turnout should vary among elections. The model has a stable equilibrium
turnout rate, Tequilib, which we explore by working with expression (6) which expresses the conditions
under which it is rational to vote.
For less important elections, b will decrease, and thus c/b increases, and so fewer people will
want to vote. But as the turnout T decreases, it becomes rational for some people on the margin to
vote. The equilibrium point of turnout is deﬁned where the probability of voting in (6) is consistent












where the probability calculation averages over the distribution of c/b among the voters, and the
factor K (deﬁned by (3)) and the fraction of eligible voters nelig/N are considered as constant for
any particular election. In an election anticipated to be close, it is reasonable to set K = 10 (see
the Appendix). Given these factors and a distribution for c/b, we can numerically solve for the
equilibrium turnout rate Tequilib.
To get a sense of the dependence of turnout on the importance of the election, we consider a
speciﬁc two-parameter family of probability distributions for c/b that allows for an asymmetrical
distribution of net utilities for voting that can be both positive and negative.9 We shall examine
how turnout (as solved for in (7)) depends on the two parameters of this distribution:
• The noncentrality parameter δ determines the skew in the distribution. In the context of
voting, it can be mapped to the proportion of the population for which net direct cost (the
term c in (5)) is positive and the proportion for which c is negative (these are the people for
which the direct beneﬁts of voting exceed its costs, irrespective of who wins). We set δ to be
positive (meaning that the net costs of voting are positive for more than half the population)
9We use the noncentral Cauchy distribution (that is, the noncentral t with 1 degree of freedom), which is appropriate
for a ratio in which the numerator can be positive or negative (Johnson and Kotz, 1970). The noncentral Cauchy
is deﬁned as a normal distribution with mean δ and standard deviation 1, divided by the square root of a scaled χ
2
1
distribution with scale parameter s.

































Figure 1: Stable level of turnout, Tequilib, as a function of the relative importance s of the election,
for diﬀerent values of δ in the distribution of cost/beneﬁt ratios (see Section 2.2). (From top to
bottom, the three curves correspond to δ = 0.5,1.0,1.5.) Because of the feedback mechanism (when
turnout decreases, the probability of a decisive vote increases), the equilibrium turnout remains in
a plausible range (between 20% and 80%), even as the importance of the election varies by two
orders of magnitude.
and consider a range of values. If δ = 1, then Pr(c > 0) = 0.16, which means that 60% of the
eligible voters would vote, even in an election with no importance. We consider values of δ
from 0.5 (in which case 31% of the people would vote under any circumstances) to 1.5 (6.7%
would always vote).
• The scale parameter s represents the average importance of the election, as perceived by
the potential voters. We consider how the turnout varies as a function of s with the other
parameters in the model held constant.
Figure 1 shows the results for this model. Each curve in the ﬁgure represents the possible elec-
tions in a hypothetical population, with the diﬀerent elections diﬀering in importance (as measured
by the scale parameter s of the noncentral Cauchy distribution) but otherwise held under similar
circumstances; that is, with a ﬁxed noncentrality parameter (0.5, 1.0, or 1.5), K ﬁxed at 10 (corre-
sponding to an election that is anticipated to be fairly close), and with nelig/N, the fraction of the
population who are eligible voters, set to 1/3. All these curves are characterized by a fundamental
stability: the importance of the election can change by over an order of magnitude, with turnout
staying in a reasonable range. This shows how the feedback mechanism works, under this model,
to keep turnout at a reasonable level.
93 Supporting evidence from political participation
Our potentially controversial claim is not the Benthamite idea of deﬁning social utility as propor-
tional to the number of people beneﬁting but rather the assumption that individual voters might
be motivated by such a social utility. Though a rigorous empirical test of our claim is beyond the
scope of the current project, we do provide some suggestive evidence.
Our supporting evidence is of two types. In Section 3, we consider information on the rate at
which people engage in political activities—such as voting and responding to surveys—that have a
small chance of aﬀecting large-scale policies. Section 4 addresses how people vote, with evidence
that vote choices are based on judgments of social goods, not selﬁsh beneﬁts.
3.1 Small contributions to national campaigns
In addition to voting, millions of people contribute small amounts of money to national political
campaigns (see Verba, Schlozman, and Brady, 1995). Volunteer work could be motivated as enjoy-
able in itself. Large contributions, or contributions to local elections, could conceivably be justiﬁed
as providing access or the opportunity to directly inﬂuence policy. But small-dollar contributions
to national elections, like voting, can be better motivated by the possibility of large social beneﬁt
than by direct instrumental beneﬁt to the voter.10 Such civically-motivated behavior is of course
perfectly consistent with both small and large anonymous contributions to charity.
3.2 Declining response rates in opinion polls
Responding to opinion polls can be thought of as another form of political participation in that
policymakers and candidates use poll results as factors in making decisions. (For example, consider
the role of opinion polls and perceived opinion changes in issues including abortion, gun control,
health care, the death penalty, and Bill Clinton’s impeachment.)
In the 1950s, when mass opinion polling was rare, we would argue that it was more rational
to respond to a survey than to vote in an election: for example, as one of 1000 respondents to a
Gallup poll, there was a real chance that your response could noticeably aﬀect the poll numbers
(for example, changing a poll result from 49% to 50%, or changing a result from not statistically
signiﬁcant to signiﬁcant). Nowadays, polls are so common that a telephone poll was done recently
to estimate how often individuals are surveyed (the answer was about once per year). It is thus
unlikely that a response to a single survey will have much impact, and so it is perhaps no surprise
that response rates have declined dramatically in recent decades (Steeh, 1981, Groves and Couper,
10Similarly, Gerry Mackie notes that the secret ballot limits the expressive value of voting.
101998, Smith, 1995, and De Leeuw and De Heer, 2002). There are of course other reasons (e.g.,
irritation at telemarketers) for the increasing nonresponse; our point here is that this pattern is
consistent with our model in which political participation is motivated by expected utility of the
social outcome.
3.3 Turnout is higher, not lower, in large elections
Voter turnout tends to be higher in large elections—in the United States, highest for presidential
elections, then congressional and state, then ﬁnally local elections tend to have the lowest turnout.
Theories of voting that focus on instrumental beneﬁts (e.g., the theory that says that voters are
instrumental utility-maximizers who happen to overestimate small probabilities) would tend to
predict higher turnouts in small elections. In contrast, the social-beneﬁt theory predicts a slight
increase in turnout for national elections, if the issues at stake are perceived as more important, on
a per-voter level, than in local elections.
More speciﬁcally, one might expect local elections to be more relevant for individual beneﬁts
and national elections to have a greater eﬀect on social beneﬁts. But the 1/N factor in the second
term of (4) ensures that the individual-beneﬁt term will be close to zero except in the most local
elections. The gradual decline of the 1
NBself term in (4) in fact would predict a very slight decline in
turnout as population increases, at least for small jurisdictions, as was in fact found by Darvish and
Rosenberg (1988) for a set of Israeli municipal elections. However, this decline would be expected
only if all other factors in the election were held constant. Since national elections typically address
more important issues, it makes sense under our model for them to have higher turnout.
3.4 Turnout is higher in close elections
Turnout tends to be higher in close elections, or, to be more precise, in elections that are anticipated
to be close, and there is some evidence to suggest that the probability of voting increases for potential
voters who perceive an election to be close. These eﬀects have been much studied (e.g., Campbell et
al., 1960, Barzel and Silberberg, 1973, Cox and Munger, 1989) and have been taken as support for
the decision-theoretic motivation for voting. However, it has been pointed out from both proponents
and opponents of the rational choice model (e.g., Aldrich, 1993, and Green and Shapiro, 1994) that
for large elections, the probability of a single vote being decisive is minuscule even if the election
is anticipated to be close. And if voting is motivated by personal satisfaction, it is not clear why
voting should give more satisfaction or discharge more civic duty in close elections.
In contrast, the increased turnout from closer elections makes perfect sense from the social-
beneﬁt theory, where even small probabilities of decisiveness are important when multiplied by the
11social beneﬁt, which is proportional to N. The natural way to empirically distinguish our social
preference, Bsoc, from civic duty is that Bsoc is multiplied by Pr(election is tied), and civic duty
is not. Of course, one could allow civic duty to be higher in close elections but then the theory
becomes tautological. A key contribution of this paper is to demonstrate that rational voting is not
a tautological theory if Bsoc is allowed.
4 Supporting evidence from political vote choices
Our theory predicts not only that rational people will vote but that a rational person who votes—
even a mostly-selﬁsh rational person—will decide whom to vote for based on social considerations.
In this section we discuss some observations about vote choices that are consistent with rational
and socially-motivated voting. This evidence is important because it recognizes voting as a serious
act of citizenship rather than simply a fulﬁllment of a civic duty.
4.1 Strategic voting
A strong piece of evidence that vote choices are perceived as consequential (and thus amenable to
decision-analytic treatment) is that voters sometimes act strategically (see, for example, Alvarez
and Nagler, 2000, Abramson et al., 1992, and Johnston and Pattie, 1991). For example, in three-
candidate races for seats in the House of Commons in the United Kingdom, it is common for
supporters of the third candidate to vote for one of the leaders, and political parties account for
these voting patterns in their strategies. Strategic voting behavior is consistent with our model
because it suggests that at least some voters are acting based on the anticipated consequences if
their vote is decisive. So it’s not merely the act of voting that motivates turnout, it’s also the
potential for aﬀecting the outcome.
4.2 Voting based on issues without direct instrumental beneﬁts to the voter
Another piece of evidence that voting is motivated by social beneﬁt is that, in surveys, many voters
say their vote choices are strongly inﬂuenced by non-economic issues that do not aﬀect them directly
(for example, if you oppose abortion, then you will not be directly aﬀected by abortion laws). It
is true that some contentious issues (for example, Social Security beneﬁts) do involve instrumental
beneﬁts to voters, but what is important for our model is that these are not the only issues of
importance to voters.
Voting is a way for citizens to get their opinions heard and respected. For that matter, it seems
quite plausible that, if Americans could vote on the Academy Awards (as they do for baseball’s
12All-Star game), turnout would be high despite the lack of personal beneﬁts from inﬂuencing such
an election.
4.3 Surveys of voter motivations
Strong evidence for our model comes from surveys of potential voters. Voters’ preferences on
national candidates and issues are strongly correlated with views on what would be desirable for the
country, and more weakly correlated with opinions about personal gain. Hence in political science,
the standard view (to which we subscribe) is that voters are socially motivated in their preferences
(see Kinder and Kiewiet, 1979, 1981, Weatherford, 1983, and Funk and Garcia-Monet, 1997). Funk
(2000) extends the idea of social-beneﬁt motivations to public opinion. These ﬁndings address who
you might vote for, not whether you turn out to vote—but if your vote choice is determined by
social-beneﬁt concerns, then it is reasonable for any decision-theoretic model of voting to include
anticipated social beneﬁt in the utility function.
For a recent example, in the 2001 British Election Study (University of Essex, 2002), only 25%
of respondents thought of political activity as a good way to get “beneﬁts for me and my family,”
whereas 66% thought it a good way to obtain “beneﬁts for groups that people care about like
pensioners and the disabled.”
5 Discussion
5.1 Social motivations and rational voting
Voters think in terms of group and national beneﬁts. We know this from survey responses and,
as we have shown in this paper, with such motivations it makes sense for many people to vote, as
contributions to collective entities. In surveys, voters say they are motivated by national conditions,
and their turnout is consistent with this assumption, so perhaps we should believe them. Conversely,
rational and purely selﬁsh people should not vote.
Survey results on socially-motivated voting are actually consistent with rational political behav-
ior although they are sometimes seen as an anomaly.11 For example, Kramer (1983) characterizes
poll ﬁndings of sociotropic voting as a statistical artifact that is “perfectly compatible with the null
hypothesis of self-interested, pocketbook voting.” As we have shown in this paper, however (see
also Meehl, 1977, Margolis, 1981, and Jankowski, 2002), voting and vote choice (including related
11Some research in political science and public opinion has identiﬁed rationality with civic-mindedness; for exam-
ple, Key (1966) wrote of a “rational” electorate concerned with “central and relevant questions of public policy, of
governmental performance, and of executive personality.” However, the literature on voter turnout has tended to
associate rationality with selﬁshness.
13actions such as the decision to gather information in order to make an informed vote) is rational in
large elections only to the extent that voters are not selﬁsh. Thus, there is no good rational reason
to consider “self-interested, pocketbook voting” as a default or null hypothesis. After all, sociotropic
voting is also perfectly consistent with the null hypothesis of rational voting, social preferences, and
sincere survey respondents.
Thus far, we have primarily emphasized our theory as explaining the “mystery” that people
vote. However, it also has implications for vote choices. Why you vote and how you vote are closely
connected. If you are voting because of the possibility that you will decide the election and beneﬁt
others, then you will vote for the policy that you think will lead to the largest average beneﬁt. There
is no reason to vote for a policy that has idiosyncratic beneﬁts to you because the individual-beneﬁt
term in your utility is essentially irrelevant for large electorates. This observation explains why the
rhetoric of politics tends to be phrased as beneﬁts to society generally or to large deserving groups,
rather than naked appeals to self interest. No doubt many people are biased to think that what
beneﬁts them will beneﬁt others, but we predict that most people will try to vote to beneﬁt society
at large or some large aﬃnity group that they are passionate about. Our contention therefore
runs counter to much of the political economy work of the past few decades. Except in very small
elections, a rational person who votes will choose the candidate or party with the best perceived
social beneﬁts to the population.
5.2 Psychological explanations for voting
Our model of voting for anticipated social beneﬁts is consistent with what we know about voter
preferences and turnout. However, other theories could work just as well. Following Aldrich (1993),
we believe that the rational model is complementary with a psychological understanding of voters.
In psychological explanations of voter turnout, most of the electorate is motivated to vote by
some mix of personal appeals and encouragement by the media. When a particular election becomes
particularly “salient” to you (because of publicity, and possibly a connection to an issue of personal
interest), you are more likely to vote. Interest in elections rises as the election approaches in
the same way that the public gets excited about the World Series, the Academy Awards, and so
forth. Turnout is higher in Presidential elections because they receive the most publicity; similarly
for close elections, where the act of voting receives more positive pre-election publicity. Voting
is a way of involving oneself in the political process, which is desirable, especially if the election
seems important, is getting a lot of publicity, and is being talked about. This story is consistent
with survey ﬁndings on motivations for political participation (Schlozman, Verba, and Brady, 1995,
Verba, Schlozman, and Brady, 1995) but focuses on the diﬀerences between elections rather than
14between voters or between modes of participation.
The other side of the psychological-political explanation is that turnout is aﬀected by political
advertising and other partisan and bipartisan eﬀorts at persuasion (Gosnell, 1927, Gerber and
Green, 2000). In close elections and important elections, it makes sense for candidates and interest
groups to put more eﬀort into persuading voters, which will increase the perceived salience of the
election and thus increase the psychological motivation to vote. Aldrich (1993) makes this point
to illustrate how political parties and interest groups can raise the psychological stakes in close
elections, which happen to be those in which the probability of a decisive vote is highest.
From the perspective of the rational model based on perceived social beneﬁts, we recognize
that all human actions, including those that are rational, need some psychological motivation, and
it makes perfect sense that a beneﬁcial action will feel pleasant also; higher perceived salience
corresponds to greater social beneﬁt from voting. Conversely, the psychological explanation does
not stand alone—voter turnout (unlike Academy Award voting) has direct political eﬀects, and
it is reasonable and appropriate to study the beneﬁts from voting, even if from a psychological
perspective they are perceived only indirectly. Politically, it is also important to understand the
factors that inﬂuence participation, since political actors are continually trying to manipulate them.
It may also be possible to learn about voter motivations using experimental studies. In two
laboratory experiments on college students, Fowler (2004a,b) has found that voters are more likely
than nonvoters to behave altruistically (as is consistent with the social-beneﬁt utility model) and
to display delayed-gratiﬁcation behavior (as is consistent with the fact that the costs of voting
are immediate whereas the beneﬁts are delayed). These experimental ﬁndings linking turnout to
altruism, patience, and party identiﬁcation have the potential to unify psychological and political
explanations of participation.
5.3 Generalizations of the model
Like all formal models of human actions, ours is a drastic oversimpliﬁcation. Our key point is not
that the curves in Figure 1, for example, exactly ﬁt turnout behavior in speciﬁc U.S. elections, but
that the model is consistent with such behavior. Now that the model includes the social-beneﬁt
term, it has the potential to be expanded in various ways already suggested in the political science
literature. For example, Uhlaner (1989) suggests that voters consider themselves as members of
large groups, and Fowler (2005a) examines evidence that an individual’s decision to vote can have
a “cascading” eﬀect that motivates others nearby in the social network also to vote. In Converse’s
famous article noting that relatively few in the public are what he calls “ideologues,” he emphasizes
that many people do think in terms of “group beneﬁts.” Recent papers extending the idea of group
15motivation include Leighley (1996) and Mutz and Mondak (1997).
The social-beneﬁt model (applied now to groups rather than all persons in the population) then
explains why voter turnout remains stable even when the number of voters within each group be-
comes large, as in national elections. Aldrich (1993) discusses a variety of interactions between
rational voting behavior and political strategists, and these interactions become clearer when indi-
viduals’ preferences are allowed to include social beneﬁts proportional to population size. Indeed,
as a ﬁrst step, future research should begin to map the relationships between social preferences and
individual concerns. Finally, a consideration of social as well as instrumental beneﬁts can allow
models to address a wider variety of contentious political issues as factors in the turnout decision
(and also in the vote choice decision, as discussed in Section 5.1).
5.4 Empirical tests and implications
We hope that our model inspires researchers to do empirical tests of its implications and estimates
of its parameters. There are many falsiﬁable implications. In principle, of course, voter turnout
might go quickly to zero as the electorate grows; we know this is not so. A prediction worth studying
is that those who give a lot to charity, given their income, and so have high values of α (see (2))
will be more likely to vote (as is suggested by the experimental work of Fowler, 2004a). Another
implication is that voters who feel certain of which candidate is better should turn out at higher
rates. A third implication is that turnout should rise when more is at stake. Fourth, one might
expect citizens in the smallest U.S. states to be more apt to vote in Presidential elections (as they
have a disproportionate electoral college vote and a higher probability of an individual’s vote being
decisive, on average; see Gelman, King, and Boscardin, 1998) and in Senatorial elections, though
other factors could mitigate against this. Fifth, a more subtle prediction is that the impact on a
Californian’s probability of voting in a national election will be roughly similar if a key issue of
concern to the voter is one that aﬀects Californians with a stake of eight hundred dollars per person
or one that aﬀects all U.S. residents with a stake of one hundred dollars per citizen. This last
comparison is more of a speciﬁcation test: if the California issue has more salience, this is less a
rejection of our basic idea than a suggestion that California voters have two diﬀerent α’s—a high
one for beneﬁts to Californians and a lower one for beneﬁts to other U.S. citizens. Finally, if one
could isolate a voter’s perception of the direct personal consequences from his or her perception
of the social good, one might test which dominates in vote choices; the diﬃculty here is the likely
causal correlation between the two. Other implications abound, and we think this a fertile area for
research.
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Appendix: Why the probability of a decisive vote is of order 1/n
If n individuals vote in an election, then the probability of a vote being decisive is roughly pro-
portional to 1/n (see Good and Meyer, 1975, and Chamberlain and Rothchild, 1981). This result
is derived based on the fact that elections are unpredictable and is supported by many empirical
studies. Let f(d) be the predictive or forecast uncertainty distribution of the vote diﬀerential d (the
diﬀerence in the vote proportions received by the two leading candidates). If n is not tiny, f(d)
can be written, in practice, as a continuous distribution (e.g., a normal distribution with mean 0.04
and standard deviation 0.03). The probability of a decisive vote is then half the probability that a
single vote can make or break an exact tie, or f(0)/n.12
For example, if a Democrat is running against a Republican, and the diﬀerence between the
two candidates’ vote shares is expected to be in the range ±10%, then the probability is about
1/(0.2n) = 5/n that a single added vote could create or break a tie.13 The exact probability
of decisiveness depends on the election and one’s knowledge about it, but even if an election is
expected ahead of time to be close it is hard to imagine a forecast vote diﬀerential more precise
than ±2%, in which case the probability of a decisive vote is still at most 1/(0.04n) = 25/n. In
practice, we see 10/n as a reasonable approximate probability of decisiveness in close elections, with
lower probabilities for elections not anticipated to be close. Gelman, King, and Boscardin (1998),
Mulligan and Hunter (2002), and Gelman, Katz, and Bafumi (2004) estimate these probabilities in
more detail for elections for Presidential, Congressional, and other elections.
12The assumption here is that an exact tie vote will be decided by a coin ﬂip. More realistically, if an election is
possibly subject to recounts—so that an exact tie in the original vote is not a necessary or suﬃcient condition for a
decisive vote—this result is still valid and can be obtained by integrating over the range of votes for which a recount
is possible (see the appendix of Gelman, Katz, and Bafumi, 2004).
13See footnote 5 on page 5.
20Some game-theoretic models have been proposed that suggest instrumental beneﬁts for voter
turnout (e.g., Feddersen and Pesendorfer, 1996), but these models also imply that large elections
will be extremely close, and so they are not appropriate for real elections where the margin of
victory varies by several percentage points from year to year. Under a coin-ﬂipping model of voting,
the probability of decisiveness is proportional to 1/
√
n, but this model once again implies elections
that are much closer than actually occur (see Mulligan and Hunter, 2002, and Gelman, Katz, and
Bafumi, 2004).
21